

Message Text

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 06350 311500Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 /026 W

-----059814 010626Z /23

R 311441Z MAR 78
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9839
INFO USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 06350

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: UR, US, SALT
SUBJECT: SALT: OGARKOV ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION/NON-TRANSFER

REF: MOSCOW 6152

1. IN MARCH 29 MEETING WITH KORNIYENKO AND OGARKOV (REPORTED REFTTEL) HASC MEMBER CHARLES WILSON, IN QUESTIONING OGARKOV ON SALT NON-CIRCUMVENTION/NON-TRANSFER, SAID THAT SEC. DEF. BROWN STATED IN BRUSSELS THAT CRUISE MISSILES WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO OUR NATO ALLIES. (HE LATER SAID THIS INFORMATION CAME FROM "NEWS ACCOUNTS" WHICH HE SAW WHILE IN GENEVA AT THE SAME TIME BROWN WAS IN BRUSSELS. THESE, HE ADMITTED, MAY HAVE BEEN MISTAKEN.) IN VIEW OF THE SOVIET DEMAND THAT THERE NOT BE SUCH TRANSFER, WILSON ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WOULD AGREE TO SALT WITHOUT A NON-TRANSFER CLAUSE.

2. AMBASSADOR TOOK THE FLOOR TO SAY THAT WITH ALL DUE RESPECT HE DID NOT RECALL ANY SUCH STATEMENT BY SECRETARY
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BROWN. HE SAID THAT IN ANY CASE THE ISSUE UNDER DISCUSSION WAS NON-CIRCUMVENTION, AND THE U.S. HAS TABLED OUR FORMULA ON THIS IN GENEVA WHICH NOW MUST BE NEGOTIATED. OBVIOUSLY, THE U.S. STANDS READY TO ABIDE BY ANYTHING WHICH IS AGREED.

3. OGARKOV, WHO HAD ALREADY ADDRESSED THE ISSUE IN HIS

OPENING REMARKS, RETURNED TO THE POINT LATER IN REPLYING TO WILSON'S QUESTION. HE SAID THAT "WE" (THE SOVIETS PRESENT) WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE WITH "YOU" (HASC MEMBERS) ON SALT ISSUES. THESE WERE ISSUES WHICH MUST BE NEGOTIATED IN GENEVA AND "AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS" OF OUR GOVERNMENTS. "WE" (ALL THOSE PRESENT) CANNOT SETTLE THIS QUESTION. NEVERTHELESS, HE CONTINUED, THE CRUISE MISSILE IS A VERY IMPORTANT STRATEGIC SYSTEM WHICH CANNOT BE EXCLUDED FROM AN AGREEMENT. REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSFERRING THIS SYSTEM TO THE NATO ALLIES, OGARKOV ASKED HOW COULD THE SOVIET UNION SIGN AN AGREEMENT PERMITTING UNLIMITED TRANSFER RIGHTS FOR THIS SYSTEM WHICH CAN STRIKE AT THE "CENTRAL REGIONS OF OUR COUNTRY." HE ALSO ASKED RHETORICALLY HOW THE U.S. WOULD ACT IF THEY WERE TO FIND THEMSELVES IN THE SOVIET POSITION. HE CONCLUDED HIS RESPONSE WITH THE REMARK THAT THE SOVIETS "CONSIDER THE CRUISE MISSILE" AN "OBLIGATORY ELEMENT FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A SALT AGREEMENT."

4. IN HIS PREPARED REMARKS AT THE OPENING OF THE SESSION OGARKOV LISTED NON-CIRCUMVENTION/NON-TRANSFER AS ONE OF THE ISSUES WHICH REMAINS A PROBLEM IN REACHING A SALT AGREEMENT. HE ASKED RHETORICALLY WHAT KIND OF AN AGREEMENT SALT II WOULD BE IF THERE WERE NO ARTICLE ON THIS POINT IN THE AGREEMENT. HE SAID THAT IT IS CONFIDENTIAL

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WELL KNOWN THAT THE NATO FORCES IN EUROPE ARE HEADED BY A U.S. GENERAL AND THAT WITHOUT AN ARTICLE ON THIS ALL NATO COUNTRIES COULD HAVE AN UNLIMITED NUMBER OF CRUISE MISSILES IN THEIR INVENTORIES. HAVING HUNDREDS AND EVEN THOUSANDS OF THESE MISSILES AIMED AT THE HEART OF THE SOVIET UNION MEANS, ACCORDING TO OGARKOV, THAT WITHOUT "SUCH AN OBLIGATION" THERE CANNOT BE ANY AGREEMENT. WITH A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH BY BOTH SIDES, HOWEVER, HE SAW THE POSSIBILITY OF RESOLVING THE ISSUE.

5. COMMENT. WE REPORT THE ABOVE IN THIS DETAIL BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH OGARKOV DID NOT CLEARLY STATE THAT A NON-TRANSFER PROVISION COULD BE EXCLUDED FROM A SALT AGREEMENT, NEITHER DID HE TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY GIVEN HIM BY WILSON TO UNEQUIVOCALLY AND SPECIFICALLY STATE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT SIGN A SALT AGREEMENT WHICH DID NOT HAVE A NON-TRANSFER CLAUSE. HIS CAREFULLY WORDED STATEMENT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MARCH 29 SESSION COULD BE GIVEN A NUMBER OF INTERPRETATIONS. AFTER BEING PRESSED BY WILSON WITH THE SPECIFIC QUESTION, OGARKOV SEEMED MOST CONCERNED IN HIS REPLY NOT TO MAKE A SPECIFIC STATEMENT ON THE

SUBJECT AND HENCE HE RESORTED TO RHETORICAL DEVICES
SUCH AS ASKING WHAT THE U.S. WOULD DO WERE THEY IN
THE SOVIET POSITION.

6. IT WOULD BE GOING TOO FAR TO STATE THAT OGARKOV
SHOWED FLEXIBILITY ON THE ISSUE BUT IT IS NOT TOO
MUCH TO SAY THAT HE DELIBERATELY AVOIDED SHOWING
INFLEXIBILITY. TOON

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETINGS, SALT (ARMS CONTROL)
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 31 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978MOSCOW06350
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780141-0847
Format: TEL
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t1978033/aaaaacod.tel
Line Count: 124
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 1a0938be-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 78 MOSCOW 6152
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3218647
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SALT: OGARKOV ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION/NON-TRANSFER
TAGS: MPOL, PARM, UR, US
To: STATE USSALTTWO
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/1a0938be-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014